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A B S T R A C T   
Introduction: One in five UK children aged 10–11 years live with obesity. They are more likely to continue living 
with obesity into adulthood and to develop obesity-related chronic health conditions at a younger age. Regu-
lating the marketing of high fat, salt and sugar (HFSS) foods and beverages has been highlighted as a promising 
approach to obesity prevention. In 2019, Transport for London implemented restrictions on the advertisement of 
HFSS products across its network. This paper reports on a process evaluation of the design and implementation of 
this intervention. 
Methods: In 2019–2020, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 23 stakeholders. Interviews with those 
responsible for implementation (n = 13) explored stakeholder roles, barriers and facilitators to policy devel-
opment/implementation and unintended consequences. Interviews with food industry stakeholders (n = 10) 
explored perceptions and acceptability of the policy, changes to business practice and impact on business. Data 
were analysed using a general inductive approach. 
Results: Practical challenges included limited time between policy announcement and implementation, trans-
lating the concept of ‘junk food’ into operational policy, the legal landscape, and reported uneven impacts across 
industry stakeholders. Political challenges included designing a policy the public views as appropriate, balancing 
health and financial impacts, and the perceived influence of political motivations. Consultation during policy 
development and close communication with industry reportedly facilitated implementation, as did the devel-
opment of an exceptions process that provided a review pathway for HFSS products that might not contribute to 
children’s HFSS consumption. 
Conclusions: Findings suggest that restricting the outdoor advertisement of HFSS foods and beverages at scale is 
feasible within a complex policy and business landscape. We outline practical steps that may further facilitate the 
development and implementation of similar policies and we report on the importance of ensuring such policies 
are applied in a way that is perceived as reasonable by industry and the public.   
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1. Introduction 
Regulating the advertisement of high fat, salt and sugar (HFSS) foods 
and beverages has been promoted as a policy lever for childhood obesity 
prevention by local and national public health policymakers and the 
World Health Organization (Lambie, 2011). The promotion of such 
policies is in recognition of the increasing importance of poor diet as a 
major determinant of childhood obesity. In the UK, children’s sugar and 
saturated fat intakes exceed recommended levels and 20% of children 
aged 10–11 live with obesity (NHS Digital, 2020). Prevention efforts 
focused on children and young people are key, as those who live with 
overweight or obesity in childhood are more likely to live with obesity in 
adulthood and develop obesity-related chronic health conditions, such 
as Type 2 diabetes, earlier in life (Sahoo K, 2015). 
The advertisement of foods and beverages has been shown to affect 
nutrition knowledge, preferences, purchasing, and consumption in 
children, with television advertising shown mainly to promote less 
healthy products (Cairns et al., 2013). These commercial activities may 
also exacerbate diet and diet-related health inequalities, as people 
belonging to more disadvantaged households have greater exposure to 
HFSS advertising and companies that deliver them in a range of outdoor, 
recreational and digital settings (Adams et al., 2012; Backholer et al., 
2020). 
In the UK, government policies aimed at curbing children’s exposure 
to the advertising of HFSS foods and beverages on television have been 
in place since 2007. Restrictions targeted the advertisement of HFSS 
foods on dedicated children’s TV channels and around programming ‘of 
particular appeal’ to children (Galbraith-Emami and Lobstein, 2013). 
However, children are also exposed to HFSS food and beverage adver-
tising in other settings; televised media itself represents only 18% of 
total advertising by revenue based on projections for 2021 (GroupM, 
2020). Evidence suggests that restrictions targeting a broader variety of 
media are required in order to have meaningful impact (Adams et al., 
2012). 
Governed by the Mayor of London, Transport for London (TfL) is a 
government body responsible for Greater London’s transport system, 
including London’s roads as well as several rail networks such as the 
London Underground, London Overground, Docklands Light Railway 
and TfL Rail. In February 2019, TfL implemented restrictions on the 
advertisement of HFSS foods and beverages across their network (see 
Box 1 for policy details and timeline). While commercial advertising 
accounts for a small proportion of TfL’s revenue (2.8% in 2017/2018) 
(Transport for London, 2019a), TfL has one of the most valuable 
advertising estates in the world. It owns 20% and 40% respectively of 
the UK and London’s outdoor advertising by value (Transport for Lon-
don, 2019b), with a total revenue of £152 million in 2017/18 (Transport 
for London, 2019a). In addition, 9.68 million trips are made on TfL 
operated public transport services per year, which equates around 36% 
of trips across all modes (walking, cycling, public transport and private 
motorised) made by Londoners (TfL, 2019c). As such, restrictions may 
contribute significantly to reducing exposure to HFSS product adver-
tising. The policy was designed to help reduce childhood obesity by 
restricting the advertising of HFSS foods and beverages consumed by 
children, with the classifications of HFSS being determined using the 
Nutrient Profiling Model (NPM) (Department of Health, 2011; Greater 
London Authority, 2018). The NPM was originally developed by the 
Food Standards Agency for the purpose of deciding which foods can be 
advertised to children via television (Department of Health, 2011). The 
TfL policy was developed as a component of The London Food Strategy 
(Greater London Authority, 2018), a product of the Greater London 
Authority (GLA), the government body responsible for the administra-
tion of Greater London and whose remit includes transport policy for the 
region. The overall strategy aimed to improve health and reduce in-
equalities in London (Greater London Authority, 2018). 
While a relatively ‘simple’ intervention, the TfL policy restricting 
HFSS advertising was developed and implemented within a complex 
policy and business landscape. Specifically, the regulation of commer-
cial activity was juxtaposed against commercial interests in a context 
where commercial revenues are reinvested into public transport. Its 
implementation requires engagement with a range of actors, including 
government- and non-government actors involved in developing and 
implementing the policy, commercial stakeholders, and the general 
public, all of whom operate within their own existing policy and market 
contexts. 
Following the launch of a public consultation on a policy restricting 
the advertisement of high fat, salt and sugar (HFSS) foods and beverages 
on the Transport for London (TfL) estate in May 2018, and announce-
ment of the policy in November 2018, the new policy was implemented 
in February 2019 and further refined with updated guidance in June 
2019. Updates included new rules on advertising single portions only, 
restricting the use of children in adverts and allowing the advertising of 
products incidental to the main advert. As part of a wider strategy 
(Greater London Authority, 2018), the policy aims to contribute to 
reducing childhood obesity. Advertisements portraying specific food 
and beverage products submitted for posting on the TfL estate are 
assessed against the Nutrient Profiling Model. Those portraying prod-
ucts classified as HFSS (receiving a score of >4 for foods and >1 for 
beverages (Department of Health, 2011)) cannot be advertised. Where 
the advertiser believes that a product portrayed in an advertisement 
does not contribute to HFSS consumption by children, they may submit 
an application to an exceptions panel which considers the evidence 
presented and makes a determination as to whether the product can be 
advertised on the TfL estate. 
In this paper we report on a process evaluation of the development, 
design and implementation of TfL’s restrictions on HFSS advertising. We 
aimed to explore the processes leading to and encompassing imple-
mentation of this intervention, with a focus on the political and practical 
factors facilitating and impeding implementation from the perspectives 
Box 1 
Policy restricting the advertisement of high fat, salt and sugar foods and beverages on the Transport for London estate 
Following the launch of a public consultation on a policy restricting the advertisement of high fat, salt and sugar (HFSS) foods and beverages on 
the Transport for London (TfL) estate in May 2018, and announcement of the policy in November 2018, the new policy was implemented in 
February 2019 and further refined with updated guidance in June 2019. Updates included new rules on advertising single portions only, 
restricting the use of children in adverts and allowing the advertising of products incidental to the main advert. As part of a wider strategy 
(Greater London Authority, 2018), the policy aims to contribute to reducing childhood obesity. Advertisements portraying specific food and 
beverage products submitted for posting on the TfL estate are assessed against the Nutrient Profiling Model. Those portraying products classified 
as HFSS (receiving a score of >4 for foods and >1 for beverages (Department of Health, 2011)) cannot be advertised. Where the advertiser 
believes that a product portrayed in an advertisement does not contribute to HFSS consumption by children, they may submit an application to 
an exceptions panel which considers the evidence presented and makes a determination as to whether the product can be advertised on the TfL 
estate.  
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of: (1) stakeholders involved in developing and implementing the pol-
icy, and (2) commercial stakeholders involved in advertising on the TfL 
estate. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Sampling and recruitment 
We recruited key stakeholders who were involved in developing and 
implementing the policy (hereafter referred to as “implementation 
stakeholders”), as well as key food and beverage industry stakeholders 
who were affected by the policy (hereafter, “industry stakeholders”). 
Sampling was purposive and informed by expert mapping of relevant 
actors and by snowball sampling. Implementation stakeholders were 
recruited from the GLA, TfL, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and Public Health England (PHE), all of whom were involved in policy 
implementation. Industry stakeholders were recruited from industry 
bodies affected by the policy, companies contracted with TfL to market 
and manage its advertising sites and sell space to advertisers, media 
buyers (companies and agencies who purchase advertising space on 
behalf of clients and brands), and food and beverage brands. 
2.2. Data collection 
We conducted semi-structured interviews (in-person and by tele-
phone) exploring the values underpinning the policy and narratives 
around the policy’s development and implementation. Interview topic 
guides were developed and piloted prior to data collection, which took 
place from June 2019–May 2020, with fieldwork delays due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Topic guides for interviews with implementation 
stakeholders asked about their role, barriers to and facilitators of the 
development, and the implementation process and any unintended 
consequences. Interviews with marketing and food industry stake-
holders explored perceptions and acceptability of the removal of 
advertising for HFSS products, impact on business, and changes made as 
a result of the policy. All interviews were audio-recorded, subject to 
participant consent. Where participants did not consent to audio 
recording (n = 2; one implementation and one industry stakeholder), the 
researcher (VE) took comprehensive interview notes. Audio-recorded 
interviews were transcribed verbatim. 
2.3. Data analysis 
Interview transcripts were uploaded to the qualitative analysis soft-
ware NVivo 12 Plus ("Nvivo (Version 12 Plus)," 2020). For interviews 
that were not audio-recorded, fieldnotes were also entered into NVivo 
for analysis alongside interview transcripts. Data were subject to anal-
ysis using a general inductive approach (Thomas, 2006), with particular 
attention paid to discordant voices and/or dissonant cases. One 
researcher (CT) independently analysed a sample of the data, devel-
oping an initial coding framework. A second researcher (RM) indepen-
dently applied this coding framework to a sample of ten transcripts to 
ensure reliability of the coding framework (see Appendix 1). Once the 
coding framework was agreed upon, one researcher (RM) coded data 
from all interviews, inductively adding new codes as new themes 
emerged. Coded data were then reviewed and organised into broader 
themes. The research team met regularly to achieve consensus in data 
interpretation. 
2.4. Ethics and informed consent 
Participants received an information sheet and consent form. Written 
informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to interview, 
with the exception of three participants who gave verbal consent 
(recorded over the telephone). Participants were able to withdraw from 
the study at any time. This study was approved by the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine research ethics committee. 
3. Results 
3.1. Participation 
We conducted 20 stakeholder interviews with 23 participants 
(Table 1) ranging from 30 to 90 min. Fifteen were conducted face-to-face 
and five by telephone. Seventeen interviews were conducted with one 
participant and three (all with industry stakeholders) were conducted 
with two participants. This was at the request of the participants and 
included communications personnel relevant to the delivery of the 
policy. Nine participants were industry stakeholders and 13 were 
implementation stakeholders. NGO names are kept confidential to pre-
serve anonymity. 
3.2. Emergent themes 
A range of practical and political factors affecting the development, 
design, and implementation of the policy emerged from stakeholder 
accounts. Practical challenges included those relating to what some felt 
was too short a timeline between announcing and implementing the 
policy; translating the concept of ‘junk food’ into operational policy to 
determine which products should be affected; legal considerations; and 
uneven impacts on different industry actors. Political challenges 
included developing a policy that could be applied in a way the public 
would perceive as ‘common sense; ’ balancing health policy with the 
financial impact on TfL; and the perceived influence of public perception 
and political motivations. Consultation during policy development, 
close communication with industry stakeholders, building on existing 
policies, and legal agreements and the development of an exceptions 
process through which advertising requests could be reviewed where 
they involved HFSS products that might arguably fall outside of the 
scope of the policy reportedly facilitated implementation. 
3.3. Practical factors 
3.3.1. Timeframe for consultation and implementation 
Industry and implementation stakeholders both felt that the timeline 
for initiating consultation (May 2018) and announcing (November 
2018) and implementing (February 2019) the policy was fast-paced. 
Some industry stakeholders felt the rapid consultation was a cursory 
“box ticking exercise” for a policy that was already likely to be adopted, 
and according to some stakeholders the “rushed” timeline resulted in 
implementing a policy with foreseeable flaws that had to be subse-
quently addressed: 
“… there is no perfect solution to this stuff … I think if we had spent 
more time considering the implementation, we might have discov-
ered some of these unforeseen, unintended consequences … without 
having to run through them live with commercial organisations.” 
- Implementation stakeholder (GLA). 
Participants also reported that, although TfL engaged effectively 
with industry when the policy was announced, the three-month period 
Table 1 
Interview participants.  
Stakeholder type Stakeholder subtype Number of participants 
Implementation Greater London Authority 6 
Non-governmental organisation 2 
Public Health England 1 
Transport for London 4 
Industry Media buyer 2 
Media seller 3 
Food/beverage brands 2 
Industry body 3  
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between policy announcement and implementation was too short for 
advertisers (who work to much longer timelines when planning and 
executing advertising campaigns) to be prepared. An industry body 
representative explained that this approach could mean incurring 
considerable extra costs to bring planned campaigns into compliance: 
“… they’re having to repay agencies, they’re having to redo creative 
inhouse when they’re actually already looking at a campaign for next 
year … their advertising is planned for the next 12 months at least … 
I think there was … a misunderstanding particularly from the po-
litical side that advertisers just kind of rang up a few days before and 
the advert appeared.” 
- Industry stakeholder (industry body). 
Advertisers also reported that they were not always informed of 
subsequent changes to the policy, sometimes only learning of them 
when advertisements they submitted were rejected. 
In contrast, implementers reported listening to industry concerns and 
carefully developing the policy based on stakeholder input during the 
consultation period. There was concern that the NPM’s scoring system 
would “give [a] black or white answer that may not necessarily work for 
this policy,” prohibiting advertisements for products that should not be 
subject to restriction. The incorporation of an “exceptions process” 
which considered the reach of the restrictions on a case-by-case basis 
was reportedly based, in part, on feedback from industry, and imple-
menters reported engaging with industry to elaborate this process: 
“… from the commercial team at TfL, they were excellent in terms of 
engaging with our members. They spent several days in here almost 
doing kind of a surgery of meetings to work out how the exemptions 
worked, so that products for things like cough sweets … how you 
except those and how you get those changes in place.” 
- Industry stakeholder (industry body). 
Implementers reported working closely with the commercial sector, 
including those developing the creative content for advertisements, to 
help stakeholders prepare for implementation of the policy. Recognising 
the difficulties advertisers faced with planned campaigns, they also re-
ported acting flexibly in the first few months of implementation by 
striving to make decisions quickly on advertisements that were sched-
uled to run in the near-term and, in some cases, permitting the use of 
HFSS images in ‘incidentals’ (advertisements for non-food products or 
services – e.g., movies, insurance or travel – that featured HFSS 
products). 
3.3.2. The challenge of operationalising the concept of ‘junk food’ 
Industry and implementation stakeholders recognised the limitations 
of applying the NPM to the new policy. One limitation was that the NPM 
does not account for the portion size of products; rather it produces a 
score per 100g. Some stakeholders argued that this was overly sensitive 
and resulted in placing restrictions on foods typically consumed in small 
quantities, such as olive oil. However, it also meant some foods were 
policy-compliant that would commonly be considered as ‘junk food’, 
such as fried chicken, which has a high protein content that is considered 
a benefit within the NPM. Such foods could therefore also be advertised 
in quantities such as ‘buckets’, which would exceed the energy content 
recommended by government for a single meal: 
“There’s quite a lot of fried chicken advertising which is actually 
permitted because the way the model works is it, it provides quite a 
lot of, sort of, good points to protein, so products with high levels of 
protein, even if they also have quite high levels of fat, become non 
HFSS.” 
- Implementation stakeholder (GLA). 
Some implementation and industry stakeholders argued that certain 
foods subject to restrictions according to the NPM, such as cough sweets, 
were not salient to children, as the policy’s target population. Other 
participants took the view that advertisements for these products 
nonetheless promoted unhealthy eating among children. Companies 
could request policy exceptions for products that they could demonstrate 
do not contribute to children’s diets, but some argued that consumer 
data used to support these requests had limitations for determining 
levels of consumption by children and was costly to industry: 
“Kantar data is what they would sometimes use as well but we know 
… that that doesn’t really give the full picture … and also that isn’t 
often available unless you have lots of money to buy it … and that 
was also for the [question of whether it has] … been demonstrated … 
that the product is not generally consumed by children … It was hard 
to, kind of, really be clear about whether it was or wasn’t, if it’s a 
product that’s in a family home.” 
- Implementation stakeholder (NGO). 
‘Incidentals’ also introduced implementation challenges. Exposure to 
advertisements featuring HFSS foods was seen as contributing to 
childhood obesity, regardless of the advertisement’s focus: 
“… I think it’s right to have a policy around incidentals because what 
we were trying to do here is dampen down the amount of unhealthy 
food that children would see. So, and it makes no difference to the 
child whether they see it under a, the banner of a junk, an actual 
brand … Or whether they see it under the banner of something else, 
they’re still seeing it. And if advertising didn’t work, we wouldn’t sell 
this network space, would we?” 
- Implementation stakeholder (GLA). 
Such non-food advertisements were reportedly modified in some 
cases to ensure compliance with the policy, and in other cases ran 
elsewhere but not on the TfL estate. In an example of the latter, in an 
advertising campaign for a cartoon movie, an animated representation 
of a high-sugar food could not be nutritionally profiled as it was not a 
‘real’ product. Rather than changing the image, which was a still from 
the film, the campaign appeared without modification in other locations 
and did not run on TfL’s estate. 
Stakeholders suggested that non-food companies were less likely to 
be aware of the advertising guidelines, and more likely to be taken off 
guard by the rejection of their advertisements based on the policy: 
“… from an ad, advertiser’s point of [view], food and drink adver-
tisers will have some understanding … of these rules already, but if 
you’re a bank, or a holiday company, or a car company or whatever, 
you probably haven’t been developing your adverts thinking about 
… being high in fat and salt and sugar …” 
- Implementation stakeholder (TfL). 
Educating advertisers as well as the creative agencies responsible for 
developing advertisements was seen as an important step in addressing 
this issue. 
The exceptions process, and consideration of the context and place-
ment of HFSS food as incidentals, allowed for discretion and nuance in 
determining whether specific advertisements were appropriate for the 
TfL estate. However, there was concern among some implementers that 
this flexibility both introduced loopholes and risked undermining the 
NPM. Moreover, some were also concerned that approaches designed to 
make the policy appear more ‘sensible’ were not consistent with the 
science underpinning the policy and were often guided by the opinions 
of implementation stakeholders who were not experts in food and 
nutrition. For example: 
“… with food, everyone thinks they’re an expert because they eat. 
So, so you get all these … people who are, you know, really well 
educated … will then say, ‘oh but butter, bacon, yeah but you know I 
eat it,’ essentially and that informs their policy decision or, or how 
likely they are to support the policy.” 
- Implementation stakeholder (GLA). 
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Despite these challenges, several implementation and industry 
stakeholders reported that commercial actors had acclimatized to the 
new policy and implementation stakeholders highlighted tangible 
changes they had observed in advertisements on the TfL estate since the 
policy came into effect. For example, a media buyer who helps to place 
advertisements observed that among their clients, “I think it’s just 
standard practice now and kind of common knowledge … what is and 
isn’t allowed.” As a GLA stakeholder observed, “I think in general when 
you look around the network you see much less food that one might 
consider to be junk food …” Another highlighted emerging effects as an 
important first step in a complex process which can be improved over 
time: 
“… what I’ve learned also is that you might want to get to a perfect 
place but actually to get there there’s a number of different steps to 
get there. And … if you think of the absolute numbers of all the junk 
food adverts have produced … actually don’t lose sight of the overall 
aim and so don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good … And 
what I’ve learned through this whole process is that there’s been 
immense careful consideration and thought that’s gone into this and 
we can’t envisage everything. But what I’d say is that we are, erm, 
what I’m quite proud of is that we’ve got somewhere and actually I 
think in the future it might be more refined and it might be that 
perfect version but, er, don’t lose sight of that.” 
- Implementation stakeholder (GLA). 
3.3.3. Legal considerations relating to policy implementation 
Developing a policy that would fit within existing legal frameworks, 
and that would not be vulnerable to legal challenges, was a key concern 
among GLA and TfL stakeholders, who worked closely with legal advi-
sors to do so. Inconsistent application of the policy was viewed as an 
important risk. However, there was recognition that this concern needed 
to be balanced with commercial and political considerations: 
“We tried to establish a policy that was workable on a consistent 
basis but would still leave perhaps some reasonable discretion to 
those applying the policy, so which would … enable reasonable but 
consistent decisions to be taken, without it being … possible for 
someone to say that we were being irrational, unreasonable or 
unfair.” 
- Implementation stakeholder (TfL). 
Addressing the challenge of ongoing advertising contracts that were 
signed before the new policy came into effect, implementation stake-
holders reported that the new guidelines were integrated into TfL’s 
existing advertising policy, which individual contracts reference and 
which could be changed. In this way, restrictions on HFSS advertising 
were added to other existing restrictions (e.g., those prohibiting the 
advertisement of weapons of mass destruction) and could be imple-
mented across all existing and new contracts. The new policy also built 
on existing processes within TfL for reviewing advertisements for suit-
ability in terms of weapons, violence and sexualisation, adding what an 
industry stakeholder described as “another layer on top of” existing 
review procedures. 
This approach of building upon existing policy was also evidenced in 
other aspects of the new guidelines. The NPM already had “credibility”, 
as one TfL stakeholder described, and was therefore selected as the 
primary measure for assessing products for advertising on TfL. 
Furthermore, stakeholders reported that the policy was developed and 
refined so that the exceptions process would take into account whether 
products were targeted in existing UK food policy initiatives (calorie 
reductions categories (Pyne et al., 2020), the soft drinks industry levy 
(HM Revenue and Customs, 2018) or other sugar reduction strategies). 
3.3.4. Differential impacts on industry stakeholders 
Participants reported that alternative advertising options and the 
impact of the policy differed for different industry actors. For example, 
implementation and industry stakeholders highlighted that food- 
delivery platforms (Hirschberg et al., 2016), who often advertise using 
generic examples of popular foods, rather than branded products, faced 
challenges others did not in nutritionally profiling their products. Policy 
implementers were not satisfied with the accuracy of nutritionally 
profiling generic images. However, industry stakeholders argued that 
availability of specific products varied by location; for example, a dish 
available from a local restaurant at one end of a public transport route 
might not be available at the other. They also reported facing challenges 
obtaining the exact nutritional content of the products advertised on 
their platforms, as they were often from the independent sector as 
opposed to from chains. Participant accounts suggest that, for the 
moment, this has been resolved by building up a database of specific, 
non-HFSS products which could be advertised. Although, a food delivery 
brand stakeholder suggested this might not be a sustainable long-term 
solution, particularly if the policy were to be adopted beyond London: 
“Well, so we might want, for example, to have an advert that has a 
picture of a curry on it. And that needs for us, in order that we can do 
it once and print it thousands of times across the TfL network, that 
needs to be something whereby the message is universal, and isn’t, 
doesn’t have to be specific to a particular part of London, or specific 
to a particular restaurant. When we’re in the position whereby it 
does have to be specific to a particular restaurant, then that means 
two things. First of which, it means that geographically, as I said 
earlier on, you lose relevance. But also, if we were to have to come up 
with multiple versions of this within London, but also, were this 
policy to extend out beyond London, looking to create thousands and 
thousands and thousands of photographs of food, and then nutri-
tionally profile at an individual restaurant level, the overhead from 
us, from a resource and from a cost point of view would be huge.” 
- Industry stakeholder (food delivery brand). 
Others highlighted uneven impacts on brands and advertising 
stakeholders – particularly those with a narrower product portfolio. For 
example, brands focused on confectionary might not have any non-HFSS 
products to feature and would therefore be unable to advertise on the 
TfL estate, while those advertising a more diverse range of products 
would be able to replace HFSS advertisements with those for non-HFSS 
products. Similarly, media sellers who owned or managed more non-TfL 
holdings in London would be better positioned than those with a nar-
rower portfolio to mitigate the policy’s impact on their business by 
moving their clients’ HFSS advertisements to other locations. 
3.4. Political factors 
3.4.1. Striking a balance between health and TfL commercial viability via 
advertising income 
Implementation and industry stakeholders voiced tension between 
the goals of implementing a new policy to promote health and main-
taining the commercial viability of advertising with TfL, considering the 
financial position of TfL itself. While there was broad agreement that it 
would be difficult to accurately calculate the financial impact on TfL, 
there was still a great deal of interest in understanding what the nature 
of any financial impact might be. 
TfL was recognised as being in a somewhat difficult position. While 
responsible for administering and implementing the policy, TfL had no 
control over its development and had to navigate its enforcement, even 
though this may be in conflict with their strategic remit of maximising 
revenue for reinvestment into public transport. Concerns about potential 
loss of revenue for TfL were often cited by GLA and TfL stakeholders. As 
a TfL stakeholder described, 
“I think there’s a want to get behind this policy and support it, [but] 
there’s a fear about the impact on revenue and the perception of TfL 
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advertising within the marketplace and what it’s meant to do to our 
brand.” 
- Implementation stakeholder (TfL). 
Highlighting the critical role of commercial advertising in generating 
revenue for the network, a GLA stakeholder suggested this tension 
played into the need for the above-mentioned exceptions process. 
Both implementation and industry stakeholders raised the possibility 
that some advertisers would opt to advertise in locations that do not 
operate HFSS restrictions rather than on the TfL estate. Some suggested 
that, comprising a relatively small proportion of available UK adver-
tising space, TfL’s influence was limited: 
“… it becomes so complex for an advertiser having to, having to go to 
create a, a different creative TfL, a different creative for Southwark 
and Lambeth because they want to ban in a different way. A different 
creative for West Midlands Transport, er, a different creative for 
Manchester, a different creative for the whole of Scotland, er, you’re 
going to see advertising just going, advertisers just going, ‘we’ll 
sacrifice the TfL estate as we can’t, we can’t do it.’” 
- Industry stakeholder (industry body representative). 
Participants cited examples of advertisements that were pulled (by 
advertisers) or rejected (by implementers) from the TfL estate as well as 
examples of modifications made to successfully bring advertisements 
into compliance. A GLA stakeholder suggested that, in some cases, these 
changes had a ripple effect on advertisements in other locations when 
these were part of a broader campaign: 
“They’re amending their brand-only … adverts to comply and, erm, 
financial services companies are not using pictures of cake anymore, 
they’re using other pictures which, you know, as long as they know 
what the policy is, it’s been fine and, and a lot of places I think the 
national, copy for their national campaigns has been amended to 
meet our policy because actually they don’t need to use that picture 
of a cake, they can use something else, be a bit more creative.” 
- Implementation stakeholder (GLA). 
3.4.2. Public perception and political considerations 
Stakeholders suggested that to be acceptable, the policy would need 
to be designed such that it could be implemented consistently and in a 
way that would pass “the reasonableness test.” Implementation stake-
holders emphasised the critical importance of the public perceiving the 
policy as “common sense,” which presented difficulty when an NPM 
assessment of product healthiness conflicted with public perceptions of 
what constitutes ‘junk food.’ There was concern that the rejection of 
advertisements for foods that the general public perceived as not 
harmful would undermine the policy and result in public backlash. An 
earlier analysis of media coverage of the ban revealed that focusing on 
specific foods that were banned – or not banned – was the most widely 
reported aspect of the policy. In some cases, HFSS foods were described 
affectionately as traditional (like jam or butter) and the banning of them 
as inappropriate and unfair (Thompson et al., 2021). 
Public perceptions of policy and communication efforts to bolster 
and maintain public support emerged as a prominent theme among 
implementation stakeholders. This was highlighted as a particularly 
important concern for the office of the Mayor of London, which intro-
duced and championed the policy. In the formative stages of policy 
development, initial public consultation was described as important for 
determining the level of public support for the policy, which was found 
to be high. Care was also reportedly taken to ensure that the office of the 
Mayor was not seen to be anti-business: 
“[The Mayor] wants economic growth, he wants businesses to grow 
but in a good way. It’s about good work, it’s about good employ-
ment, good practices and it’s not … increasing the bottom line at any 
cost.” 
- Implementation stakeholder (GLA). 
Implementation stakeholders suggested that negative media 
coverage was impossible to avoid; focusing on developing a robust 
policy was seen as key to implementing durable transformational 
initiatives. 
While some participants viewed the exceptions process as driven by a 
combination of industry interests and concern for public perception, it 
was also framed as key tactic in pushing back against industry opposi-
tion and playing a role in the policy’s successful launch: 
“… and I think that it probably did have the effect of ensuring that 
the policy, when it launched, launched really, it landed really well … 
by having the exemptions option within the policy, took the rug out 
under the feet of the naysayers a bit, because you know it wasn’t 
saying, there’s no way that any of your products will be advertised 
it’s, well saying well, they need to pass the nutrient profiling, but and 
unless you can make a really good case. So it, I think tactically, it 
supported a good launch for the policy.” 
- Implementation stakeholder (GLA). 
Both industry and implementation stakeholders expressed frustra-
tion with what they perceived as politically motivated influences on the 
initiation, development and implementation of the policy. Several in-
dustry stakeholders reported skepticism about the motivation for the 
policy or for the speed of its implementation, with some describing it as 
a “legacy project” or “political statement” that lacked a sufficient evi-
dence base. As one participant put it, 
“… without being too harsh on the Mayor, it’s a political statement to 
say here, I can take direct action, I’ve done something, but it’s maybe 
not the most effective thing, but it’s an easier thing to do. I think that 
was probably a concern, which I think we, we have, it’s hard to write 
that down so explicitly, but it’s on everyone’s mind.” 
- Industry stakeholder (industry body). 
Implementation stakeholders also acknowledged the influence of 
political factors, describing the policy as “highly political” and 
acknowledging that any policy initiative must take into account not only 
values and ethics, but also the potential for and cost of anticipated 
backlash. Still, they frequently expressed frustration with navigating the 
office of the Mayor’s concerns about backlash and negative press, and 
their worry that the Mayor would reconsider his commitment to the 
policy in the face of these challenges and an upcoming bid for re- 
election. As one participant described, 
“Well, I realised that we’re in a political environment and what we 
didn’t want to happen was lots of items that the general public don’t 
see as a problem being on the front of the newspapers and almost 
undermining the true aim of the policy of, you know, getting rid of 
the really bad stuff in some ways. And what we didn’t want to 
happen was the Mayor to have a really hard time in the newspapers 
and for him to lose complete interest in the policy and give up.” 
- Implementation stakeholder (GLA). 
Some participants felt that political motivations could overshadow 
the science underpinning the policy, in some cases weakening the policy 
in response to undue influence from industry lobbyists. Similarly, par-
ticipants suggested that public appearances where the Mayor was “put 
on the spot” with queries about specific products or campaigns could 
pose challenges, with one participant suggesting that “offhand” public 
comments from the Mayor could sometimes influence the direction of 
the policy, presenting a challenge to the judgement of those with more 
specialist knowledge of the nutrition field: 
“We actually I mean at meetings had discussions about shifting it in 
different directions because the Mayor made some offhand comment 
in a[n] interview, you know, I mean that’s crazy because, you know 
… there’s no way that you can write policy around offhand 
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comments that someone who is not, you know, is not up on the latest 
in nutrition or food policy is making.” 
- Implementation stakeholder (GLA). 
4. Discussion 
This process evaluation aimed to explore the development and 
implementation of TfL’s restrictions on the advertising of HFSS products 
across their network. Our analysis revealed that the development, 
design and implementation of the policy was influenced by practical and 
political factors. Our findings suggest that consultation during the policy 
development stage, close communication with industry stakeholders, 
building on existing legal frameworks and the development of an ex-
ceptions process facilitated the process of developing and implementing 
the policy. Implementers also faced challenges stemming from practical 
and political issues. In practical terms, using the NPM to classify ‘junk 
food’ was seen as beneficial as it drew on an existing, credible tool. 
However, the tools available for determining what is an HFSS product 
can produce policy anomalies. The NPM was developed and tailored to 
assess foods in television advertising (Department of Health, 2011). 
When utilised to support TfL’s policy, considerations around portion 
size, identifying what products might be aimed at children, how to treat 
food products that appear incidentally in advertisements for non-food 
products, and how to deal with advertisements for delivery platforms, 
all needed to be addressed. 
The exceptions process was a key mechanism through which several 
of these challenges were addressed, and was perceived as helping in-
dustry navigate the policy as well as decreasing resistance towards it. In 
terms of its incorporation into TfL’s policy, our findings suggest that the 
exceptions process was informed in part by concerns raised by industry 
stakeholders, reflecting the results of a recent systematic review which 
found that the adoption of obesity prevention policy is facilitated by 
political systems that provide opportunities for stakeholder input when 
making regulatory decisions (Clarke et al., 2016). 
However, there was concern among some implementers that the 
flexibility offered by the exceptions process risked undermining the 
policy and was not always consistent with the science underpinning it. 
From the outset, the policy was political and controversial and attracted 
a high degree scrutiny from industry and the media. Success of the policy 
hinged upon striking a balance between health and commercial 
viability, specifically advertising income considerations, though con-
cerns around commercial viability were later discovered to be un-
founded as TfL reported that there has been no impact of the policy on 
advertising revenue (Sweney, 2021). Public perception, media coverage, 
and maintaining public support were ongoing concerns that further 
complicated the development and implementation processes. 
Both implementation and industry stakeholders were critical of the 
influence of political considerations on the policy. For implementers, 
there was concern that the policy might be watered down, comprising 
impact. In contrast, industry stakeholders were concerned that political 
pressures meant the policy was pushed through without sufficient evi-
dence in support, resulting in restrictions that were too harsh. To add 
context here, the political leanings of The Mayor (a Labour party 
candidate) traditionally supports a more interventionist approach 
compared to more non-interventionist conservative politicians. Socio- 
political context often positions upstream public health interventions 
and industry interests in opposition to each other (McKinlay and Mar-
ceau, 2000). These tensions are evident in the accounts given here, and 
suggest closer alignment of policy and industry goals may be useful. The 
fact that both implementation and industry stakeholders were con-
cerned that the policy didn’t fully accommodate their priorities or 
concerns could be interpreted as an indication that it struck a successful 
balance. However, industry actors are often invested in avoiding regu-
lation and typically have substantial resources to do so (Adams et al., 
2016). Overall, despite the identified challenges, the policy appears to 
have been implemented effectively and industry stakeholders were able 
to comply with the new restrictions. Added to which, public health in-
terventions that target industry tend not to result in long-term negative 
impacts for industry (Larcker et al., 2011; Law et al., 2020). 
Childhood obesity is the product of a wide range of complex causal 
mechanisms operating at a variety of levels (Swinburn et al., 2011). 
Many of these originate upstream, and as such, require population-level 
interventions in order to tackle them (Swinburn et al., 2011). At present, 
public health evidence tends to focus on “downstream” individual-level 
behaviour change interventions, which are easier to study but tend to 
produce only short-term benefits (Cairns et al., 2013; Knai et al., 2018). 
Population-level interventions are also considered by some to be syn-
onymous with limiting free choice (Frieden, 2010), and as such, there is 
a perception that they are less acceptable to some stakeholders, notably 
politicians, the public, and the food industry (Adams et al., 2016). In this 
study, participants initially had concerns about securing and managing 
public acceptance of the policy. However, public consultation in the 
formative stages of policy design found that it was popular with the 
public, and implementers were mindful of maintaining public support in 
the face of criticism by industry and the media (Thompson et al., 2021). 
That the intervention targeted children was the main selling point of the 
policy to the public, both in terms of the rationale for the policy and how 
the exceptions process was designed and managed. This finding supports 
work that suggests interventions targeting children and young people 
typically attract the most public support (Diepeveen et al., 2013) and are 
therefore important policy considerations. 
Practical issues with using the NPM to operationalise the TfL policy 
have been encountered elsewhere. Jenkin et al. (2008) suggest that 
consideration should be given to the categorization of condiments and 
ingredients in order to either exempt them altogether or make them 
subject to different rules, thereby avoiding controversies over ‘banning’ 
them. Nutrient profiling models do not come with recommendations 
about how to apply them to real-world advertising policies and so im-
plementers have to make their own judgments on whether and how to 
adapt them. Additional contextual decisions have to be made on how 
strict the regulation should be and which food categories are broadly 
‘healthy’ or ‘unhealthy’ (Scarborough et al., 2013). In addition, use of 
the NPM does not allow consideration of brand-only marketing within 
the design of the policy. Brand-only marketing has shown to be associ-
ated with brand awareness and brand loyalty and may be a driver of 
product purchases from these brands, irrespective of whether products 
themselves are advertised (Gabrielli et al., 2021; Fischer et al., 1991). As 
we have discussed elsewhere (Thompson et al., 2021), tools such as the 
NPM are works in progress that need to be updated and modified for 
specific uses and contexts. Previous research has suggested that the NPM 
is not always a consistent discriminator of what constitutes a less healthy 
product (Mytton et al., 2018). A key lesson for policy is that, in the 
short-term, there is a need to develop processes to better accommodate 
the nuances surrounding the implementation of specific policies (i.e. in 
the case of TfL, the exceptions process) and longer term, develop better 
tools that allow for a better and more consistent categorization of HFSS 
and other less healthy products. 
4.1. Lessons for implementation 
Our findings suggest that the policy was effectively implemented and 
commercial stakeholders quickly accepted and adapted to its re-
quirements. As similar policies are currently being considered or 
implemented elsewhere (Postans, 2021), there are several lessons for 
successful implementation that may help navigate practical problems, 
allay political and industry concerns, and maximise potential public 
health gain (see Box 2). Many of these lessons outlined below may also 
have utility as generalisable strategies that could be applied across a 
wider range of population-level interventions, especially for policies 
that involve regulation and involve public and industry stakeholders. 
Legal considerations, public engagement and consultation with industry 
R. Meiksin et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Social Science & Medicine xxx (xxxx) xxx
8
were seen as central. In addition, crafting a policy that can be imple-
mented in a transparent and consistent way that is perceived as ‘fair’ by 
industry stakeholders, and as ‘reasonable’ by the public – while allowing 
for adaptations in response to implementation challenges – was 
essential. 
4.2. Strengths and limitations 
This paper adds to the evidence base on the implementation of 
complex interventions and policies to address childhood obesity (Knai 
et al., 2018; Rutter et al., 2017). The intervention involved a wide range 
of actors from across multiple sectors, and we recruited from a diverse 
pool of stakeholders to generate a robust account of the policy process. 
However, limitations on fieldwork capabilities due to the COVID-19 
pandemic prevented us from directly exploring public perception of 
and views on the policy. Additionally, it is possible that participants’ 
responses could be influenced by the interviewer’s identity as a public 
health researcher. However, participants shared both positive and 
negative reflections and findings were often similar across industry and 
implementation stakeholders, suggesting that participants were candid 
in their responses. 
Though our analysis of the implementation of advertising re-
strictions on a transport network was in one city, thus limiting 
generalisability, the policy has attracted interest from local and national 
government elsewhere in the UK and internationally, and potentially 
provides insight into the optimisation of policy in other jurisdictions. 
5. Conclusions 
Designing and implementing restrictions on the advertisement of 
HFSS foods, especially to children, is high on the public health policy 
agenda both locally and nationally, but is not without challenge. These 
challenges may be political as well as practical and require careful 
thought at the design and planning stages in order to pre-empt criticism 
and allow for smooth policy implementation. Key to policy success was 
the ability of commercial stakeholders to quickly adapt to restrictions, 
and this was facilitated by the existence of a process where specific 
products on the boundary of the policy could be assessed for compliance. 
Overall, this paper demonstrates that policies and interventions aimed at 
restricting the outdoor advertisement of HFSS foods and beverages at 
scale are highly feasible. For optimal implementation of similar future 
policies, and to maximise potential public health gain, implementers 
should consider the recommendations outlined above. This might 
include a particular focus on adapting existing tools to better define 
HFSS products by considering portion size, total calories of advertised 
product and the salience of products to children.  
Appendix 1. Codes and themes  
Theme Codes 
- Operationalising junk food 
- Clarity and guidance 
- Law and legal 
- Mismatched sectors and skills 
- Exceptions panel/process 
- Stakeholder strategies 
- Working with Industry 
- Time pressures 
- Health 















•‘outside my expertise’ 
•‘off the cuff’ vs food science 
•Uneven impacts 
(continued on next page) 
Box 2 
Lessons to inform stakeholders when implementing policies restricting the advertisement of HFSS foods and beverages.  
• Ensure that the policy complies with existing legal frameworks and contracts early in the policy development process  
• Conduct a public consultation of the policy and publish the response to submissions to ensure transparency and accountability to policy- 
making process.  
• Engage early with industry to understand practical concerns around implementation (e.g., timing of advertising, advertising content).  
• Ensure the policy maintains a level playing field for different industry stakeholders.  
• Consider adaption of processes that use existing tools to define HFSS products (such as the NPM) by having supplementary evidence-based 
criteria to help achieve policy goals (e.g., recommended portion size, recommended calories per meal) or by having a decision-making body to 
consider specific products (e.g. the exceptions process).  
• Establish a transparent and consistent process for making compliance decisions on specific products that may or may not fall within the aims 
of the policy, dedicating the time and resource required for this to be sustainable.  
• Consider a consistent process for addressing non-standard products. For example, ‘generic’ or ‘model’ representations of foods and beverages; 
or products/meals that are produced in non-standardised ways by small businesses that do not have the resource to undertake nutritional 
profiling.  
• Ensure the policy passes a ‘reasonableness’ test in order to maintain support from policymakers, industry and the public. Develop and 
maintain consistent messaging and take steps to pre-empt media critiques.  
• Allow flexibility to change and adapt the policy over time in response to emergent challenges.  
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•Setting a precedent 
•The application process 
•‘Trade off’ 
•Not reinventing the wheels 
•Over the line 












•‘Outside of remit’ 
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